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From commitment to compliance:  ASEAN’s human rights regression? 
Abstract 
Whether it is the persecution of the Rohingya, the disappearance of human rights activists, 
the general limiting of freedom of speech across the region, or the resumption of the 
arbitrary use of the death penalty, Southeast Asia can be said to be facing a human rights 
crisis. This human rights crisis is though occurring at a time when the region’s institution, 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), has never been so interested in human 
rights. After a lengthy period of time in which ASEAN either ignored, or paid lip service to 
human rights, the Association has created a human rights body – the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) – and adopted an ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration (AHRD). In this article I utilise the Spiral Model to explain how, when 
ASEAN member states are regressing in their commitment to human rights, an 





The terminology in the article’s title, “from commitment to compliance”, is the sub-title in 
the publication, The Persistent Power of Human Rights (PPoHR) (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 
2013). This is the follow-up publication to The Power of Human Rights (PoHR) (Risse, Ropp 
and Sikkink, 1999), which introduced into the literature the Spiral Model. The key purpose of 
this article is to utilise the Spiral Model to explain how, when ASEAN member states are 
backtracking on human rights, ASEAN’s Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
(AICHR) is continuing to promote human rights. A divergent trajectory would appear 
implausible because ASEAN is an intergovernmental organisation that reflects the stance of 
its member states. With regression prevalent in its member states the expectation is ASEAN 
too will regress from the commitment shown with the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
(AHRD) to backing its member states’ actions by deflecting internal and international 
criticism.  The anodyne September 2017 ASEAN Chairman’s statement on the Myanmar 
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government’s use of violence against the Rohingya would indeed suggest that this is the case. 
However, the argument posited is because ASEAN has a human rights body that consists of 
“independent-minded” representatives that remain committed to its mandate to promote 
human rights, there is evidence of activities that indicate a movement from human rights’ 
commitment to human rights’ compliance. The argument is not that AICHR can halt member 
states’ regression. Not only is it too soon to know the outcome of various activities, such as 
the rights of the disabled, but also AICHR cannot implement plans; the decision to comply 
with human rights ultimately rests with the member states. The argument is that while human 
rights are regressing in Southeast Asia, AICHR is continuing to reaffirm, on behalf of its 
member states, a commitment to human rights and by agreeing regional action plans 
preparing the ground for their compliance. Compliance ultimately rests with such regional 
action plans informing national action plans.  
 
In order to determine AICHR’s capacity to turn a commitment into compliance I utilise the 
Spiral Model, which the PoHR authors hoped would be transformational for our 
understanding of how states’ engagement with human rights proceeds from repressing human 
rights to being compliant with international legal standards safeguarding human rights. In the 
follow-up publication, PPoHR, the authors focused on what stopped states, and other actors, 
from turning a commitment to abide with international standards of human rights into acting 
in compliance with them. I have complemented this textual analysis with interviews 
conducted with past and current AICHR representatives.1  
 
The article proceeds with the following structure. First, I explain the various phases of the 
Spiral Model and introduce two new variables from PPoHR that detail what tools are 
available to actors pressurizing states to engage with human rights (called mechanisms) and 
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the different contexts that apply to states that help explain the likely success of these tools 
(called scoping conditions). Couching this discussion in terms of state compliance is helpful 
in clarifying the model’s core assumptions, specifically the inherent contestability of norms,  
and PPoHR’s evolution of the model. It will also help with the charting of the region’s 
engagement with human rights in the article’s second part. However, the application of the 
model will be different in the third and final section of the article where the mechanisms and 
scoping conditions are applied to AICHR.   
 
In the second part I use the model to chart ASEAN’s engagement with human rights and 
thereby reveal member states’ progression and their subsequent regression. Currently the 
literature on ASEAN’s human rights record does not systematically use the Spiral Model, and 
none do so with the updates contained in PPoHR, although it does get a brief mention by 
Mathew Davies (see 2014a and 2014b) and Catherine Renshaw uses it to frame a specific 
examination of human trafficking in Southeast Asia (2016).   
 
In the final part I show how the model, with the new variables from PPoHR, can be used to 
interpret the actions of AICHR representatives to reveal how they are seeking to uphold 
member states commitments to human rights and even lay the groundwork for their 
compliance. This adds to the literature on AICHR, which is primarily concerned with why 
and how it was created (Munro, 2011; Poole, 2015; Tan, 2011a; Tan, 2011b). 
 
 




The Spiral Model posits a spectrum of five phases along which states can be plotted 
according to how they engage with human rights (Risse et al., 1999, p. 20, p. 32). At one 
extreme this engagement is simply to disregard the human rights of its citizens and this first 
phase is called repression. The second phase is denial where the state acknowledges that 
something terrible is happening but denies that it is a human rights abuse. The third phase is 
called tactical concessions and marks the first time that the state has shown a commitment to 
human rights. However, as the name suggests, this commitment is purely an instrumental one 
to relieve pressure rather than an indicator that the state sees an inherent value in respecting 
human rights. This stage is often marked by such actions as the release of political prisoners 
or the holding of a show trial. The fourth phase is prescriptive status and this is where the 
state signs and ratifies international human rights treaties and begins the process of adjusting 
domestic legislation to reflect its treaty obligations. The final phase is called rule-consistent 
behaviour and this is where the obligation to safeguard human rights is both institutionalised 
in the public and private sectors and habitualised within the state’s society.  
 
The process, and it is a three-stage process, that explains how a state moves through these 
phases is one of socialisation (Risse et al., 1999, pp. 12-17). In the earlier phases (repression 
through to tactical concessions) the state’s motivation to engage is based on a logic of 
consequence as it determines the benefits and costs of withstanding or succumbing to the 
pressure exerted on it from domestic civil society activists and international bodies. This is 
called instrumental rationality and while it is possible that the state will adapt its behaviour 
because of pressure, this is done to deflect criticism and assuage other states with the elite 
having little intention of abiding by the human right’s norm in the long-term. It is a tactical 
concession that may reflect a rhetorical change that amounts to little more than window 
dressing. However, once the state has shown a commitment to human rights by making 
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tactical concessions then PoHR argues that while state leaders may regard talk as cheap they 
can become entrapped by the rhetoric they endorse, and thus in the long run find they cannot 
so easily explain away a gap in their rhetoric and actions. This is where the second 
explanation arises. Governments respond to continuing criticism by engaging in dialogue 
over the meaning of the particular human rights norm. They are in effect engaged in 
argumentative discourse; which is the second stage of the three-stage process. The key point 
is that the debate has shifted over whether the government intends to act in accordance with 
the human rights norm at all, to how it will abide by it. The existence of a dialogue also 
indicates that the government takes the opposition actor(s) more seriously and treats them as 
valid interlocutors. The stage of argumentative discourse is, according to PoHR, the most 
important. Here the debate clarifies the prescriptive essence of the human rights norm and 
thus how the government should behave by abiding with it. Argumentative discourse is thus 
prevalent in phase 3 (tactical concession) and 4 (prescriptive status) and is considered so 
important because this is where contestation over what the human rights norm means and 
how it can be implemented occurs. It could be that this is never fully resolved and partly 
explains why some states get “stuck” in phases 3 and 4 (see Jetschke and Liese, 2013). 
According to PoHR once the meaning of the human rights norm has become understood then 
a logic of appropriateness replaces the logic of consequence as the state both pursues policies 
that institutionalise the human rights in domestic laws and practices, especially those adopted 
by enforcement agencies, and educates society so that compliance becomes a habitual 
practice of citizens and enforced by the rule of law. This is the final stage of socialisation and 
is called institutionalisation and habitualization.   
 
The follow-up publication, PPoHR, recognised that this progression, especially from 
commitment to human rights (phase 3) to compliance with human rights (phase 5) was overly 
6 
 
simplistic and that it reflected the optimism about the power of human rights prevalent by the 
end of the 1990s. PPoHR was published in 2013 and here its optimism was tempered by a 
decade in which the most powerful democracy in the world had engaged in systematic abuses 
of human rights, notably kidnapping (extraordinary rendition), indefinite detention without a 
fair trial (Guantanamo Bay detention camp), and torture (enhanced interrogation techniques). 
This regression in human rights, coupled to a series of empirical studies using the Spiral 
Model that indicated some states did not reach phase 5, lead PPoHR to introduce two new 
variables; mechanisms and scoping conditions. 
 
There are four mechanisms, three of these are the tools that domestic activists and 
international bodies and networks can use to pressure unwilling states to commit to human 
rights, and one mechanism can assist states that are willing but just unable to comply with 
human rights. The first three are coercion, changing incentives and persuasion, while the 
fourth, is capacity-building. Coercion is the use of force, such as provided by Responsibility 
to Protect, or a legal instrument, such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, that requires the state to adjust its behaviour or action will be taken against the elite. 
Changing incentives is the use of sanctions or rewards to encourage change. Examples of this 
include attaching conditions, such as evidence of improving human rights, to foreign aid 
packages. These first two mechanisms rely of instrumental rationality to induce change. The 
third, persuasion, is the use of argumentative discourse to alter the state’s belief about the 
validity of the human rights norm. While this is likely to begin in combination with one or 
both of the previous mechanisms, it is more likely to accomplish state compliance with 
human rights if it emerges as the dominant mechanism. This is because ultimately 
compliance is more stable if the state is in compliance because it believes in the inherent 
value of human rights rather than seeing them as the better of two evils, or the necessary, but 
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unwanted, condition attached to an aid package. The fourth, capacity-building, is the 
provision of resources to enable states to engage in the education and training of its citizens, 
and the development of bureaucratic procedures and the infrastructure to implement the 
human rights obligations it has committed to by signing and ratifying human rights treaties.  
 
The scoping conditions, of which there are five, refers to the context surrounding the target 
state. The first, and the most important, is regime type. While PPoHR adopts the widely held 
opinion that democracies are more willing to commit to and comply with human rights 
because they empower their citizenry by making them part of the political process 
(governments have to be responsive to the peoples’ needs and accountable to their electorate, 
for example), they note that it is not the case that the more robust the democratic regime the 
more likely it is to support human rights. Instead they argue, as a consequence of George W. 
Bush’s administration’s blowback on human rights, that robust democratic regimes, just as 
with robust authoritarian regimes, can engage in powerful counter-narratives to human rights 
without fear that this will endanger the regime. In the case of the Bush Administration the 
counter-narrative of national security (War on Terror) trumped the narrative of human rights 
and the USA moved to phase one (repression) as evidenced by the torture committed at the 
Abu Ghraib prison. It has been particularly resistant to pressure since and even after two 
terms of the Obama presidency the USA still practices indefinite detention and sending 
detainees to countries that employ torture. It is at best back to phase four (Sikkink, 2013).  
The finding of this scope condition is that it is regime transition which provides the window 
to exert pressure. Emerging democratic regimes that have replaced authoritarian ones are 
more amenable to committing to human rights because they are predisposed to seeing human 




The second and third scoping conditions have similar outcomes. The second is limited 
statehood, which means that the government may have territory that is notionally under its 
control but in reality it is not governed by the state. This captures failing states where the 
monopoly on the use of force is not centrally held or in those states where the regime lacks 
capacity to enforce its rule. The third scope condition is decentralisation, a global 
development where political power is devolved to local power centres. In both cases such 
conditions mean that although the state might commit to human rights the extent to which 
this is accepted throughout the territory is either unknown (limited statehood) or the 
interpretation of the human right is contested (decentralisation) and implemented in a manner 
that could be inconsistent with international standards.  
 
The fourth and fifth conditions are also similar in that they are concerned with the severity of 
the target’s vulnerability to external pressure. The fourth is material vulnerability, which 
concerns the extent to which the state’s material wealth enables it to resist coercion or 
incentives. In this instance, China’s economic growth has helped it resist pressure to improve 
its human rights record. The fifth condition is social vulnerability, which replaces material 
wealth with social worth and prestige. The more upholding human rights are central to a 
state’s identity, or membership of an international organisation, the more socially vulnerable 
it is to accusations that its behaviour is unbefitting. Here persuasion in the guise of naming 
and shaming might be an effective tool.  
 
It is then appreciating that certain mechanisms are going to be more effective depending upon 
the target’s scoping conditions that PPoHR employ to show how a move from commitment to 
compliance can be accomplished. It should be noted that these variables are also applicable to 




The Spiral Model is certainly not without criticism and it has been critiqued for being linear, 
unidirectional and underestimating the degree of contestation that is prevalent throughout the 
adoption of human rights. While the authors refute the accusation of the model being linear 
(Risse et al., 2013, p. 33), it is not unusual for descriptions to move through the phases in 
sequence (see Sikkink, 2013). While there is no reason to believe a state must move from 
phase one through to five in sequence they do note that phase 4 is a necessary precursor to 
phase 5 (Risse et al., 1999, p. 31). They accept the accusation of the model being 
unidirectional – that is the inexorable power of human rights – and the overly optimistic view 
that the stronger human rights’ arguments would prevail in argumentative discourse (Risse et 
al., 2013, p. 15). This is not to suggest that in PoHR they did not expect considerable 
resistance. They did, and they acknowledged that movement through the phases may slow 
and even drift backwards, but ultimately these would be temporary setbacks before the power 
of the human rights’ discourse shifted the state down the path towards phase 5. In PPoHR this 
unidirectional view of the Spiral Model is problematised and there is a recognition that 
regression in human rights is possible because persuasive counter-narratives can be launched 
by the state. This is reflected in the current norm literature, which has increasingly focused on 
norm degeneration (Panke and Petersohn, 2011) and has revealed that states are adept at 
using counter-narratives to resist and pushback against human rights advocates. For example, 
Fernando Nuñez-Mietz and Lucrecia Garcia Iommi (2017) note how, in the case of LGBT 
rights, some state authorities were able to discursively construct these rights as a threat to 
their national identity. Having done this, they were then able to adopt legislation that would 
make it more difficult for advocacy groups to promote LGBT rights. Nuñez-Mietz and Garcia 
Iommi refer to this as norm immunization as the state pre-empts the challenge of a human 
rights discourse by (a) establishing a discursive terrain that is unfavourable and (b) creating a 
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legal environment in which advocacy is hindered. Interestingly they argue that because the 
state is preparing for the contestation ahead of the battle – its preparations are like a vaccine – 
once discursive battle commences the state is able to identify the activists promoting the 
human rights’ norm as the threat as much as the norm itself.  Once the domestic advocacy 
groups are identified as a threat to the state’s society then their links to regional or 
international networks can be used against them as evidence of foreign intervention. This 
reveals that well-orchestrated campaigns, backed by foreign donors, can paradoxically create 
greater resistance. Not only can this explain regression of human rights commitments but, as 
Rochelle Terman writes, it can also lead to a counter-narrative that alters beliefs and 
preferences about the norm itself. Terman refers to this as defiance, and argues that rather 
than regressing human rights the argumentative discourse alters the target state’s (and its 
society’s) normative preferences and so creates a ‘new constellation of intersubjective beliefs, 
practices and institutions’ (2017, p. 7). In this instance what constitutes the human rights 
norm has been altered, so it does not regress, instead, in the guise promoted by human rights 
advocates, it dies.  
 
The final critique concerns the Spiral Model’s proposition that the argumentative discourse 
stage of socialisation ultimately ends as a logic of appropriateness underpins the 
institutionalisation and habitualisation of human rights by phase 5. If the USA can deploy 
counter-narratives around national security to rollback on habitually and institutionally 
understood breaches of human rights, such as kidnapping and torture, then contestation, or at 
least the possibility of contestation, never ends. This suggests that a logic of consequence is 
at play as the counter-narrative competes with the current belief about the appropriateness of 
the norm. By positing that there are benefits from defecting on the norm, or costs associated 
with continuing compliance, contestation reveals that the logic of consequence can be evoked 
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in phase 5. It could be that the state engages in a discourse that reinterprets the meaning of 
the norm in a particular context, thus avoiding the accusation of norm violation (see Dixon, 
2017). The Bush Administration was able, for example, to argue that the war on terror 
produced a changed context that made extraordinary rendition and enhanced interrogation 
techniques permissible. A similar argument is made with regard to slavery by Islamic 
extremists, who argue that in times of war the women of the opposing side can rightfully be 
considered chattels for the victorious. Hence the claim, ‘Slavery is a part of Islam’ (WND, 
2003) and the re-establishment of slavery by ISIS and Boko Haram (CNN, 2014; 
Christopher, 2014). Of course, Muslims contest these views and this is not to argue that 
slavery is likely to return as a legal trade, rather, those arguments for and against abuses of 
human rights remain contestable even in phase 5.  
 
The Spiral Model has therefore evolved and while the phases and stages of socialisation 
remain useful in understanding progression and regression, it is pertinent to note that because 
contestation remains possible across all phases, even with the most deeply-embedded norms, 
narratives, counter-narratives and rhetorical strategies adopted by advocates and state elites 
are on-going. It is perhaps therefore less the persistent power of human rights and instead the 
persistent battle for human rights. In this respect a significant finding emerges from 
combining the scoping condition, Regime Type, with Nuñez-Mietz and Garcia Iommi, as 
well as Terman’s, findings that counter-narratives (immunization, defiance) are more 
effective when the advocates for the human rights norm are at their strongest. That is, the 
more definitive the advocacy the more the state elite are able to present it as a threat, and they 
are more capable of doing this the stronger, or more stable, their regime. A stable regime is 
thus better able to marshal its resources to present the advocacy as a threat, possibly by 
foreigners, to the state’s identity than a regime undergoing transition. This implies that in 
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those situations where the regime is strong, advocacy is more likely to achieve success from 
those actors that make it harder for the state elite to present it as a threat to the state’s identity. 
This does not mean weak advocacy, but rather targeted advocacy where resistance is likely to 
be less. This maybe assisted if the source of the advocacy comes not from an outsider 
institution, but rather from a regional, inter-governmental, institution whose raison d’etre is 
to buttress the stance of its member states.  In part three this will be AICHR, but before 
examining this the second part will chart ASEAN’s engagement with human rights. The 
progression through the phases, and subsequent regression, provides the context for 
appreciating different member states understanding of why AICHR was created and what it 
can, and cannot, do. 
 
 
2. The Spiral Model in action  
 
ASEAN’s engagement with human rights 
 
While not without contention it is relatively easy to plot ASEAN’s engagement with human 
rights along the Spiral Model’s spectrum. ASEAN’s core principles in support of state 
sovereignty, especially non-interference, ensured that for much of its history the Association 
ignored human rights abuses. Indeed, it could be argued that by doing nothing while state 
leaders such as Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and Suharto in Indonesia abused their 
peoples’ human rights ASEAN tacitly supported the repression of human rights. The 
emergence in the 1990s of an international discourse on human rights, initiated by the 1993 
Vienna Conference, resulted in a willingness in ASEAN to discuss human rights but this 
discussion amounted to a denial of a problem. For the member states this is captured most 
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strongly in the Asian Values debate over what constituted universal human rights and 
whether they were indeed universal; Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia and Lee Kuan Yew in 
Singapore were two of the most outspoken regional leaders in defence of Asian Values. This 
denial resonates with the PPoHR findings that when regimes feel strong they are more 
capable of resisting. The 1990s were the time of the Asian Tigers and the regimes of both 
Mahathir and Lee were regarded as successes. Both regimes were to feel less assured after the 
1997-98 financial crisis and the Asian Values debate became less prominent and, as will be 
noted below, initiated ASEAN’s move to the next phase. While Asian Values captured the 
member states’ denial, for the Association itself denial was subtler. Following the Vienna 
Conference, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers made the Association’s first explicit reference to 
human rights in their Joint Communiqué at the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 
1993. In addition to considering the creation of a regional human rights regime the 
communiqué also stressed ‘that ASEAN should coordinate a common approach on human 
rights’ (ASEAN, 1993). This was to become known as baselining; seeking to establish some 
degree of harmonisation of the differences among the ASEAN members over what 
constituted human rights. ASEAN outsourced this to a semi-official, track-II, body – 
ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium on Human Rights – and after ten years little progress had been 
made. It was a form of denial; not an outright rejection but rather an inability to make 
progress on committing to human rights because the Association had not yet achieved a 
consensus on what its members understood constituted human rights.  
 
The 1997-98 financial crisis was to provide a change of context that made the move to tacit 
concession possible. Not only did it undercut some of the confidence about Asian Values - 
Lee was moved to admit that nepotism is a Confucian weakness, and Amitav Acharya writes, 
‘guanxi – roughly, the use of personal connections to one’s advantage outside the legal 
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framework – is now said not to be a good Asian value’ (1999, p. 422) – but it also brought 
down the Suharto regime and ushered in a period of regime transition to democracy in the 
primus inter pares of ASEAN. This leads to the adoption of the Vientiane Action Programme 
(VAP) in November 2004; Tan Hsien-Li refers to it as a ‘turning point’ (2011b, p. 140) and 
Mathew Davies as a ‘remarkable change in how ASEAN thought about human rights’ (2013, 
p. 385). The significance of the VAP is not only that it places human rights in the context of 
achieving security, thus placing human rights at the core of ASEAN’s purpose, but it also 
reveals the ability of well-placed, elite, norm entrepreneurs – in this instance the Working 
Group for the Establishment of an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (the Working Group) 
– to influence ASEAN’s stance. The Working Group utilised previous ASEAN commitments 
on human rights to cajole state elites; that is, entrapping them in the rhetoric they had 
previously endorsed. However, the audience for the Working Group was not domestic 
activists, but rather ‘key interested parties at an elite level, in particular domestic politicians’ 
(Davies, 2013, p. 397). Given ASEAN’s inter-governmental nature this reveals that rather 
than empowering domestic activists to bring about a change in member states’ attitude 
towards human rights, the change has to be couched in language that fits with the prevailing 
view of ASEAN members and presented by norm entrepreneurs that have the elites’ respect. 
Hence the importance of “independently-minded” AICHR representatives as detailed below. 
 
While for Indonesia the adoption of the VAP is part of a reconstitution of its identity as a 
post-authoritarian state, for other ASEAN members it can be seen as a tactical concession 
since some were, and remained, sceptical of the virtues of a human rights body (see Ryu and 
Ortuoste, 2014, pp. 368-370). This tactical concessions phase continues through to the 
ASEAN Charter in which a commitment to a human rights body is endorsed. It remains a 




in July 2007…Jakarta and Manila managed to achieve approval for the clause on the 
establishment of a regional human rights body in a compromise that avoided the 
introduction of a majority voting mechanism. The Vietnamese, Laotian and Burmese 
governments saw changes to consensus-based decision-making in ASEAN as the 
greater evil (2008, p. 537). 
 
It is the adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) in November 2012 and 
the twin goals of promoting and protecting human rights enshrined in AICHR’s Terms of 
Reference (ToR) that denotes the current prescriptive status.  
 
What this narrative describes is not just an evolution of ASEAN engagement with human 
rights but it also reveals that ASEAN is not an institution that cajoles, persuades or pressures 
its member states. The drivers for change were regional CSOs and Indonesia; for details of 
this see Collins (2013) and Dosch (2008). ASEAN reflects its members’ stance on issues and 
therefore ASEAN’s stance on human rights is not separate from its member states. Thus 
when human rights were increasingly prominent in ASEAN discourse in 2007, ASEAN felt 
compelled to comment, critically, on Myanmar’s suppression of monks during the Saffron 
Revolution. In response to the violence Singapore’s foreign minister, George Yeo, speaking 
on behalf of the ASEAN foreign ministers, responded by expressing their “revulsion” to the 
Burmese foreign minister and being “appalled” by the government’s use of automatic weapon 
fire (Roberts, 2010, pp. 155-6). Ten years later the ASEAN response to the use of automatic 
weapon fire by the Burmese military against the Rohingya drew a very different response. 
Reflecting the regression of human rights across Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s condemnation of 
the use of force conflated the violence used by the government forces with that from the 
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Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), and rather than an assessment of the conflict 
ASEAN focused on the humanitarian disaster that unfolded on the Myanmar-Bangladeshi 
border. If ASEAN is simply a reflection of its member states, what prospect is there that 
AICHR might represent something independent and engage in activities that reaffirm a 
commitment to human rights? Before answering this, we firstly need to note the human rights 
crisis that represents the region’s regression. 
 
 
Repression and Denial: An ASEAN human rights regression 
 
When a state engages in repression or denial it moves from its previous phase instantly. In the 
Philippines, the steady progress in promoting and protecting human rights since the fall of 
Ferdinand Marcos is being stripped away by the Duterte administration. This can be seen in 
his opposition to two significant human rights achievements that followed the People Power 
revolution that ousted the Marcos dictatorship; the abolition of the death penalty and the 
enshrining in the 1987 Constitution of a Philippine National Human Rights Institution 
(NHRI). The Philippines’ NHRI is the oldest in Southeast Asia and Duterte has sought to 
undermine it and reinstate the death penalty. His presidency has unambiguously treated 
criticisms of his approach to human rights as fallacious and no more than convenient tools for 
foreign interference. Tom Smith writes,  
 
Duterte has succeeded to a significant degree in making human rights a dirty word, 
lacing it with his anti-Western and anti-imperialist rhetoric. According to him, the 
concept of human rights is to blame for protecting the drug lords and causing the 




We can therefore interpret Duterte’s encouraging of extra-judicial killings as repression 
because he explains it as a necessary part of his war on drugs (The Guardian, 2016).  
 
Myanmar’s counter-narrative that the violence against the “Bengalis” is an act of national 
security because of the terrorist threat from ARSA, can be interpreted is a form of denial. 
Here the government is seeking to deny the narrative of “ethnic cleansing” and “genocide” 
from the international community. Denial is thus evident in the refusal to recognise the name 
Rohingya for the targeted community, thus denying them an identity, and the government’s 
narrative that the cause of the violence lies with ARSA. Denial can also be witnessed in 
Thailand where the deaths of 98 people (and more than 2000 injuries) caused in 2010 during 
the confrontations between the Abhisit government and the United Front for Democracy 
against Dictatorship, popularly known as the “Red Shirts”, will not result in criminal 
proceedings against those responsible (Human Rights Watch, 2017). More broadly, 
repression and denial is also evidenced by the numerous cases of disappearances throughout 
the region.2 
 
It is not surprising given the importance of regime type as a scoping condition that this 
regression in human rights has coincided with an authoritarian turn in Southeast Asia (APHR, 
2017). While some ASEAN members have not changed regime type and remain authoritarian 
or “soft” authoritarian, it is the turn to authoritarianism in those more liberal states who were 
at the forefront of driving ASEAN’s human rights progression that is pertinent. While this is 
most marked with the military coup in Thailand and its 20th Constitution granting extra 
powers to the military, it can be seen in the Philippines where Duterte’s admiration for 
Beijing reflects his conviction that China’s authoritarianism has produced economic results 
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that the Philippines’ unwieldy democratic system has not delivered (Bello, 2017). It can also 
be witnessed in Indonesia where Duterte’s “solution” to the Philippines drug problem has 
inspired President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo to encourage his law enforcement agencies to kill; 
‘I have told you, just be firm, especially with foreign drug dealers who enter the country and 
resist [upon arrest]. Gun them down. Give no mercy’ (The Jakarta Post, 2017). More broadly 
there has been concern expressed at the restriction in religious freedom in Indonesia and the 
rights of marginal groups, such as the LGBT community.  
 
What does this shift to repression mean for ASEAN? It was noted earlier that the ASEAN 
Chairman’s Statement in response to the violence in Rakhine can be interpreted as a shield to 
deflect external criticism directed at the Myanmar government. This protection of Myanmar 
was replicated at the 31st ASEAN Summit held in November 2017. What though of AICHR? 
Its silence in the face of this regression could be interpreted as evidence of support for 
ASEAN members. Hence the accusation from Philippine human rights group, Karapatan, 
that, ‘AICHR should act decisively to address the urgent concerns of peoples in South East 
Asia now, lest it fully exposes itself as another inter-governmental body that deodorizes 
governments such as the Philippines’ (Interaksyon, 2017). The perceived failure of AICHR to 
respond to the regression of human rights in Southeast Asia has led to it being dismissed by 
civil society advocates as a meaningful human rights body. Phelim Kine, the Human Rights 
Watch deputy director for Asia, states, ‘it serves no substantive function’, its primary purpose 
is, ‘to deflect international criticism about ASEAN’s human rights record’, and is ‘purely 
eyewash’ (Gavilan, 2017). This certainly gives the impression that by failing to act AICHR is 
complicit in the regression and thus party to the repression and denial of human rights abuses 
occurring in Southeast Asia. Therefore, what evidence is there that AICHR represents phase 
4 and far from backtracking is, through its promote and protect mandate, consolidating an 
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3. Prescriptive status: AICHR’s promotion (and protection)  
 
The argument that AICHR is on a separate trajectory to the ASEAN membership is counter-
intuitive. AICHR is inter-governmental, its representatives are appointed by governments and 
answerable to them, it operates according to consensus decision making, it has no 
investigative powers and has no enforcement mechanism. Although in the case of the latter, 
while this did attract criticism when AICHR was created, the lack of coercive capacity to 
punish non-compliance was essential to achieve the consensus necessary to create AICHR. 
The Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy Task Force on ASEAN has produced annual 
documentation revealing the limitations of AICHR and these reveal not only specific limits in 
its mandate - it is promote not protect - but also the constraints the ASEAN Way imposes on 
how AICHR operates (see Forum Asia, 2016).  Essentially a modus operandi that requires 
consensus, prevents interference and prioritises non-legalistic mechanisms for resolving 
disputes is ill equipped to safeguard human rights. Consequently, it is not going to entertain 
formal debate about human rights abuses - although informally AICHR representatives do 
discuss them - but this does not mean it is silent on promoting human rights amongst the 
ASEAN membership. The purpose of this article is not therefore to suggest AICHR can 
reverse the trajectory of ASEAN member states’ human rights regression. Rather, to reveal 
how AICHR’s trajectory is at odds with the member states’ trajectory, and how AICHR is 
preparing the groundwork for turning a human rights commitment into compliance by 




Although AICHR representatives are appointed by their government, this does not mean that 
they have to be government officials. While most AICHR representatives have been selected 
from ASEAN members’ foreign ministries or other government departments and continue to 
hold their government positions concurrently with their AICHR role, some have been chosen 
from outside of government. Out the first ten AICHR representatives, two were non-
governmental appointees; Rafendi Djamin (Indonesia), who is a human rights activist, and Dr 
Sriprapha Petcharamesree (Thailand), who is a leading human rights’ academic. AICHR 
representatives serve a maximum of two, three-year terms in office. Currently three AICHR 
representatives are not government appointees; two of them have a legal background – Dr 
Seree Nonthasoot (Thailand) and Edmund Bon Tai Soon (Malaysia) – and one is an academic 
(Dr Dinna Wisnu representing Indonesia).  AICHR representatives can be replaced at any 
time by their government without the need for an explanation; this happened to the human 
rights’ activist Loretta Pargas-Rosales (Philippines) in 2016 who was replaced by Leo 
Herrera-Lim from the Department of Foreign Affairs. The significance of their backgrounds 
informs their understanding of how “independent” they are of their government. Those from 
outside the government do see themselves as independent, and in their role as promoters and 
protectors of human rights they are the more active AICHR representatives and have initiated 
project-based Task Forces; such as the one on the rights of the disabled. They are also more 
willing to broadly interpret the topics for discussion under AICHR’s thematic studies and 
other programmes and activities.3 Independent does not therefore mean to be critical of their 
government’s position, but rather a free hand to initiate Task Forces and to interpret 
AICHR’s programmes and activities. In this regard, we can interpret AICHR as similar to 
Kelly Gerard’s “participatory spaces”. Gerard uses this phrase to describe the forums 
ASEAN establishes to engage with civil society, but also to control that engagement. They 
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encourage ‘problem solving and building consensus’, but not, ‘contestation or independent 
representation’ (Gerard, 2014, p. 81). AICHR is similar in that problem solving and 
consensus building is the aim but this, as noted below, arises from a process of subtle 
contestation by “independent” government appointees over AICHR’s modus operandi. It is 
within this freedom of being a participatory space that AICHR can propose and discuss 
human rights and, if consensus is reached, promote such rights within the Association. For 
example, work on the Right to Life thematic study addresses the death penalty on the 
initiative of the Thai AICHR representative, and through a process of negotiation with 
another AICHR representative, this is focused on the treatment of convicted individuals 
awaiting their sentence.   
 
Utilising the Spiral Model’s scoping conditions and mechanisms it is possible to evaluate the 
challenges AICHR will encounter in the direction of travel from commitment to compliance 
when the context is far from propitious. Scoping conditions in this instance apply to AICHR 
itself and concerns the body’s mandate and its modus operandi. That is, what it does and how 
it does it. The mechanisms are the tools available to the “independent-minded” 
representatives and we are interested in how they use them to promote and protect human 





Scoping conditions in PPoHR are applied to states and thus applying them to AICHR is 
unorthodox. Ordinarily in the Spiral Model AICHR would be the body utilising mechanisms 
to cajole and persuade member states to commit to, and comply with, the AHRD. However, 
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because a number of AICHR representatives hold, or held, government positions they are not 
independent of member states and they interpret their role as spokespersons for their 
government. Thus, AICHR itself becomes the participatory space in which those AICHR 
representatives that see their role as independent engage with those that do not as they seek to 
turn commitment to compliance.  
 
PPoHR’s most important scoping condition is regime type; when a regime is in transition to 
democracy it is more likely to be supportive of human rights. While AICHR cannot have a 
regime-type applied to it, its modus operandi, specifically its ToR and more broadly the 
ASEAN Way, can be utilised for this purpose since this does explain AICHR’s governance 
mechanism. Essentially, how decisions are reached and how they are implemented. This is a 
real bone of contention for the critics and underscores much of their criticism. While 
AICHR’s ToR (ASEAN, 2009) codifies that it has both a promote and protect mandate the 
three fundamental elements to protect are missing: it has no process or procedure for 
receiving complaints; it cannot investigate; it cannot provide a remedy. It has a promote 
mandate with the potential, because the ToR can be revised, to protect at some indeterminate 
time in the future.4 This limitation in what it can do is further exacerbated, according to the 
critics, by its consensus decision making and the need to avoid interfering in member states 
internal affairs. It is indeed difficult to see what a human rights body can do if it cannot 
comment on internal affairs, since this is where abuses of human rights occur, and requires 
the agreement of the recalcitrant member state that is the subject of criticism for its human 
rights’ record. Conceived in these terms AICHR’s ToR makes it a challenging arena for the 
independently minded representatives to cajole the more reticent representatives to firm up 
their human rights commitments and strengthen compliance. This is though an interpretation 
of the ASEAN Way that equates consensus with unanimity and non-interference with 
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indifference. This is contentious, and an interpretation at odds with the meaning attributed to 
the ASEAN Way by ASEAN’s founders.  
 
The ASEAN Way was not designed to hinder independent states from cooperating. It 
reflected the reality that states, which for the most part had not long freed themselves from 
colonial rule, were not going to establish a supranational institution that would impinge on 
their independence. It encourages independent sovereign states to work cooperatively 
together in a familiar, non-threatening, environment that rejects the adversarial posturing, 
majority voting and legalistic governance structures prevalent in the West. Non-interference 
did not mean indifference to neighbours but rather a mechanism by which member states 
could support one another. Initially this meant deflecting criticism aimed at the elite but it has 
evolved through initiatives such as flexible engagement to mean assisting one another to 
manage transboundary problems that require regional solutions.5 Consensus is designed to 
ensure no one state can impose its views on others and this includes the notion that one state 
can veto a decision; it is designed to ensure equality among the members. Consensus does not 
therefore mean unanimity. Consensus reflects the need to make all members comfortable, to a 
greater or lesser degree, with the subjects discussed and decisions reached. If one member 
does not wish to participate then through a process of consultation, it would be reassured that 
its concerns would be respected and in return it would not prevent others from proceeding; 
this is known as the ASEAN minus-X principle. Being opposed did not mean becoming 
estranged and consensus via consultation ensured ASEAN was united in how it managed the 
wishes of all members. Conceived in this way the notion of non-interference and consensus is 
not a hindrance to achieving commitment and compliance with human rights, but rather the 
modus operandi that AICHR representatives need to reinterpret, mould and manipulate when 
they deploy the mechanisms at their disposal. That is, by problematizing consensus as 
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unanimity and non-interference as indifference this reinterpretation of AICHR’s governance 
structure – its “regime type” – is tantamount to instigating a regime transition, thus enabling a 
renewed commitment to human rights and laying the groundwork for compliance with 
international human rights. However, before examining how this is done – which entails the 
notion of best practice – we need to reflect on the other scoping conditions.      
 
The second and third scoping conditions concern the degree of control the state has over its 
territory, with lesser control making it more difficult to achieve compliance. In this instance 
we can interpret this to means AICHR’s position within ASEAN’s structure. According to its 
ToR AICHR is designated as the overarching human rights institution in ASEAN with 
overall responsibility for human rights. This, coupled to it being the human rights body 
created in the Charter, would appear to give it a preeminent position within ASEAN and 
above both the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and the Protection of the Rights of 
Women and Children (ACWC) and the ASEAN Committee to Implement the Declaration on 
the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (ACMW). The working 
relationship between these three is though ambiguous and while ASEAN has used the 
language of alignment to reinforce a sense of hierarchy with AICHR above the ACWC and 
ACMW, the notion of AICHR being  “overarching” and having “overall responsibility” has 
been resisted. Consequently, a coherent and concerted promotion of human rights becomes 
hindered when the activities of ASEAN’s human rights bodies are not aligned. 
 
This delineation of where the remit of AICHR extends is particularly noticeable in its 
interactions with the coordinating bodies of ASEAN’s community pillars. It is not evident, 
according to an AICHR representative interviewed, that AICHR is recognised as ASEAN’s 
overarching human rights body with its remit covering all three pillars.6 There was instead a 
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sense from one pillar that AICHR was meddling in areas that were not in its purview. This 
type of “turf war” is commonplace within organisations so perhaps not surprising but it 
indicates that even with the agreement of all AICHR representatives the embedding of 
appropriate human rights practice in ASEAN activities is not straightforward. Thus AICHR’s 
promotion of human rights can be constrained by bureaucratic politics within the association. 
While this is different in format to those constraints caused by the devolution of power 
captured in the second and third scoping conditions it is similar in style. That is, incoherence 
caused by a lack of clarity over where authority lies to promote and protect human rights 
resulting in either resistance or disjointed implementation.  
 
The final two scoping conditions concern the state’s vulnerability to material and social 
considerations. The more vulnerable the target because of limited resources (material) or their 
sense of self-worth is wanting (social) the more susceptible they are to pressure. With regard 
to material vulnerability, there is inadequate funding for AICHR activities from ASEAN.7 
This has resulted in AICHR representatives procuring funding from external agencies via 
funding schemes such as: the ASEAN-China Cooperation Fund, the ASEAN-ROK 
Cooperation Fund and the Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument Human Rights 
Facility. The danger is that recommendations resulting from external funded activities, as 
noted previously by Nuñez-Mietz and Garcia Iommi, can be rejected because they are 
portrayed as representing foreign interests and fail to reflect the particularities of Southeast 
Asia. While this is a potential problem AICHR representatives have largely avoided this 
accusation, thus indicating awareness that funding from external sources is a double-edged 
sword. Social vulnerability however does expose AICHR. Here the question of self-worth 
refers to how AICHR is perceived internationally and this does matter because AICHR is the 
embodiment of ASEAN’s external facing commitment to human rights; it has to appear 
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credible.8 While it is true that AICHR’s mandate has led to much criticism of its credibility – 
it is often described by CSOs as toothless – ASEAN is at pains to stress that one of AICHR’s 
purposes is to, ‘uphold international human rights standards as prescribed by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, and 
international human rights instruments to which ASEAN Member States are parties’ 
(ASEAN, 2009). This is not only stated in AICHR’s ToR, it is stated in the AHRD and 
reiterated in the Phnom Penh Statement that accompanied the release of the AHRD (see 
ASEAN, 2012a; ASEAN, 2012b). This reveals that AICHR is socially vulnerable to 
accusations it is not fit for purpose as a human rights body because such accusations undercut 
its ability to show ASEAN members take their commitment and compliance with 
international standards of human rights seriously.  
 
The scoping conditions reveal three findings. First, problematizing consensus as unanimity 
and non-interference as indifference is necessary in order to approximate regime transition. In 
essence, denying recalcitrant representatives the resort to consensus or non-interference to 
block initiatives.  Second, AICHR’s ability to promote human rights within the ASEAN 
bureaucracy, and thereby establish regional action plans for member states to implement, is 
hindered by an ambiguous alignment with the other ASEAN human rights bodies and 
Sectoral Bodies. Third, buttressing the AHRD as meeting international standards is important 
because this gives ASEAN’s commitment to human rights credibility. ASEAN is thus 
socially vulnerable to any attempt to utilise the AHRD to defend an abuse of human rights. In 
essence, any attempt to vindicate an abuse of human rights by recourse to the AHRD can be 
resisted on the grounds that doing so damages ASEAN’s human rights credentials. These 
scoping conditions are opportunities for “independently minded” AICHR representatives to 
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The first two mechanisms presume that a degree of coercion is possible to induce change. 
This change is achieved either through direct threats of punishment or rewards for 
compliance. In light of the ASEAN Way, the first (coercion) is unlikely and the second 
(changing incentives) is only likely to be invoked as part of the third mechanism, which is 
persuasion. Persuasion is the use of argumentative discourse to establish and reinforce the 
manifestation of a prescriptive status and the embedding of rule-consistent behaviour through 
institutionalisation and habitualisation. ASEAN’s emphasis on consultation and consensus 
makes persuasion the most important mechanism for AICHR representatives. Using 
argumentative discourse they can seek to cajole and encourage their AICHR colleagues to 
agree to the recommendations that arise from the activities they undertake and from the task 
forces they establish. We can discern three effects from these activities that indicate AICHR 
representatives are utilising persuasion effectively.  
 
First, it can establish a position on a subject considered non-contentious from which further 
discussion can evolve to subjects that are more contentious. Second, it can encourage other 
AICHR representatives to initiate activities on the same subject area. Third, these initiatives 
can inspire activities in different subject areas. A good example of all three effects concerns 
AICHR’s activities on the rights of the disabled initiated by the Thai representative, Seree 
Nonthasoot. This has the potential to highlight the principle of discrimination, and by doing 
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so, reveal that human rights’ abuses stem from discrimination. In essence, if discrimination is 
rejected on grounds of disability then the door is open to examining discrimination on other, 
more contentious, issues.  
 
The second effect is that it has encouraged other AICHR representatives to initiate activities 
on the same subject area. For example, the Vietnamese representative has utilized the rights 
of disabled to examine disabled children’s access to primary education in Vietnam. Without 
the AICHR task force on the rights of the disabled it is unlikely that this would have 
happened.9  The significance of this is that government officials rarely initiate task forces, 
although they do take responsibility for executing thematic studies.10  The embracing of the 
topic by other representatives is also important for gaining consensus and this bodes well for 
the action plan currently being developed gaining approval.  
 
The third effect of AICHR representative activity is that it can spill over into other areas. 
Regional consultations in 2017 were held on human rights, environment and climate change, 
the right to safe drinking water and sanitation, and the right to education. One area in 
particular that has significant potential for promotion and protection concerns legal aid, and it 
is not a coincidence that the notion of “access to justice for all” that is prominent in the rights 
for the disabled is the tagline for legal aid.  In October 2017, AICHR conducted a regional 
consultation on legal aid led by Seree Nonthasoot. Legal aid is significant for protecting 
human rights because without the means to seek redress through the courts, those that have 
suffered injustice cannot be recompensed. A consultation is the first step in garnering views 
from a variety of stakeholders and can be considered a baselining activity. In this instance, 
the meeting gathered information about legal aid for specific groups, such as women, 
children, victims of trafficking and migrant workers, and more contentious, cases related to 
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natural resources as well as criminal cases. The former is contentious because of state 
implication in land grabbing from indigenous communities (see Cherry, 2013; Neef, 2016).  
 
This activity is encouraging and indicates that while not headlining grabbing, AICHR 
activities are showing a commitment to promoting human rights. However, evidence of 
member states’ commitment to human rights, and the means by which member states’ 
compliance can be ascertained, requires an ASEAN regional action plan to be agreed that 
establishes internationally recognised standards that member states’ national action plans 
should substantiate. The purpose of this article is to determine if AICHR is reaffirming 
commitment and laying the ground for member state compliance so here evidence is the 
adoption of a regional action plan.  
 
A good example is the Task Force on Mainstreaming the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
in the ASEAN Community. This had met four times by the end of 2017 and there had been 
three meetings of AICHR’s Regional Dialogue on the Mainstreaming of the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities. The task force formulates the draft versions of the action plan that 
the regional dialogue debates. The latter is therefore the arena in which the mechanism 
persuasion will determine success or failure to gain consensus needed. There are reasons to 
be optimistic. There is clear evidence that ASEAN is at phase 4 since it has already 
committed itself to promoting the human rights of the disabled through existing documents; 
namely the Bali Declaration on the Enhancement of the Role and Participation of the Persons 
with Disabilities in ASEAN Community and the Mobilisation Framework of the ASEAN 
Decade of Persons with Disabilities 2011-2020 (ASEAN, 2013). In addition, in 2016 all 
ASEAN member states had ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. The topic of the Task Force is thus not contentious and the discussion is framed 
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around existing ASEAN and international commitments. Evidence of persuasion can be seen 
from the extension of these rights. Initially, the focus was on health, education and 
employment affecting persons with disabilities and the remit has now increased to examining 
issues pertaining to access to justice, persons with disabilities as entrepreneurs and disability 
perspective in disaster risk management. As noted above, Vietnam has taken an interest in 
education, as have others that have significant numbers of amputees.11  The topic therefore 
has support amongst a wide breadth of AICHR representatives. 
 
One of the discursive moves made during the debates around the rights of the disabled was to 
link progress in this area with achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
This is a tactical move in persuasion. Showing ASEAN members that by meeting 
international standards with regard to the rights of the disabled they are also achieving SDGs, 
makes agreeing to the rights of the disabled more likely. Argumentative discourse entails 
framing the discussion so that actors become entrapped by their previous commitments. Just 
as with the rights of the disabled, Seree Nonthasoot has framed legal aid around existing 
ASEAN commitments. He has said: 
 
The study of legal aid is an important initiative to implement the ASEAN Vision 2025, 
especially the blueprints of the three ASEAN Community pillars. Without ensuring 
access to justice to ASEAN citizens, we cannot aspire to be a rule-based, inclusive and 
resilient community. Nor can we be a people-centred and people-oriented Community 
if we leave those who are entitled to effective legal assistance behind (ASEAN, 2017a). 
 
It is too soon to know whether this will gain traction but it is significant development given 




The final PPoHR mechanism is capacity-building and this is where a shift from commitment 
to compliance is hindered because of lack of capacity rather than will. A good example of 
where AICHR is using this scoping condition is Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) based 
on internationally accepted business and human rights principles. CSR was the first thematic 
study undertaken by AICHR and a baselining report was produced in June 2014. AICHR has 
utilised the expertise of a number of stakeholders from states, businesses and CSOs in 
regional dialogues and has adopted the 2011 United Nations Guiding Principles (UNGP) on 
Business and Human Rights as the standard-bearer of what needs to be institutionalised in 
national action plans and habitualised in business practice. In order to accomplish this 
compliance with the UNGP, AICHR is seeking to adopt a regional strategy on CSR and 
human rights and it has begun training activities to prepare member states and businesses to 
recognise their UNGP obligations. While at an early stage, utilising the UNGP will help to 
move CSR provision in ASEAN members from the current promote attitude of it being 
voluntary and philanthropic, towards internationally accepted protect provisions including 
‘appropriate and effective remedies’ (ASEAN, 2017b). In light of the significance of the 
economic pillar in ASEAN’s community building programme, and the subsequent 
acceleration of its implementation, the embedding of human rights compliance is likely to be 
evident sooner here than in the other community pillars; the use of capacity-building via 
training programmes is the evidence that there is will to make progress in this area.  
 
These activities are indeed encouraging. They indicate significant activity from 
“independent” AICHR representatives that are framing discussion within pre-existing 
ASEAN commitments and linking these commitments to international standards. The choice 
of non-contentious topics is enabling a breadth of support amongst AICHR representatives 
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that concurrently hold government positions, which is essential to achieve a regional action 
plan. The topics are also enabling argumentative discourse to emerge around the protection of 
human rights, and while tentative and at an early stage, this is emerging because (a) the 
source of this persuasion is highly respected AICHR representatives, (b) the debate is framed 
around pre-existing commitments, and (c) the approach is to highlight how compliance is 
beneficial (changing incentives).  
 
However, the criticism directed at AICHR is less the topics that its programmes and activities 
investigate, but rather its modus operandi and the inadequate benchmark established by the 
AHRD. That is, for all the progress made through effective persuasion it counts for little if 
the scoping conditions that AICHR operates within can nullify progress. It is therefore 
equally significant that argumentative discourse is concurrently being utilised to reinforce, 
firstly, what the AHRD commits its members to, and thus avoid backsliding, and secondly, 
reinterpreting what consensus means. That is, using the mechanism persuasion to exploit a 
social vulnerability, and reframing AICHR representatives’ understanding of AICHR’s 
governance mechanism (the ASEAN Way) thus approximating a process akin to regime 
transition. 
 
The first concerns Malaysia’s AICHR representative, Edmund Bon Tai Soon’s, interpretation 
of the AHRD (see Soon, 2016). The AHRD was roundly criticised by international and 
regional actors for diluting international human rights standards when published in November 
2012. Three articles in particular draw criticism: that rights must be balanced with duties 
(Article 6); the realisation of rights is dependent upon national contexts and thus not universal 
(Article 7); that all the human rights safeguarded in the AHRD are subject to many 
limitations, including on grounds of public morality (Article 8). A statement from Human 
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Rights Watch, which was endorsed by regional CSOs, decried it as undermining rather than 
affirming international human rights laws (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Dismissing the 
AHRD in this manner undermines ASEAN’s human rights credentials and far from 
signifying evidence of phase 4, it implies the AHRD is at best a tactical concession and at 
worst a tool to be used to deny human rights. While this may reflect the position of some 
ASEAN members it does not do so for others and, as previously noted, ensuring the AHRD, 
and by implication AICHR, are regarded internationally as corresponding to international 
standards is important.  Edmund Soon’s interpretation is less a rebuttal to the critics of the 
AHRD, as a reinforcement of the AHRD’s credentials as a human rights declaration in 
accordance with international standards.  
 
He begins by noting that because the AHRD specifically reaffirms ASEAN members’ 
commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and other international 
human rights commitments there is ‘no inconsistency or conflict between [them]...in relation 
to the minimum applicable standards of human rights’ (2016, paragraph 7).  This positioning 
of the AHRD in accordance with international standards underpins his rejection that Articles 
6-8 can be used by ASEAN members to dilute ASEAN’s commitment to human rights. On 
Article 6 he writes that this,  
 
merely calls for a “balance” in the performance of “corresponding duties”. The 
enjoyment of one’s right does not rely on his or her due performance of duties because 
ultimately the primary responsibility still rests with ASEAN Member States to promote 




He also notes that duties appear in other human rights declarations and in the case of the 1981 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights these duties are more extensive. With regard 
to Article 7, he dismisses as ‘misguided’ the argument that regional particularities erode the 
universality of human rights (2016, paragraph 10.2). He argues that different contexts ‘serve 
to enrich the discourse on human rights’ (2016, paragraph 10.2) and that so long as minimum 
standards are met the need to consider regional and national contexts simply reflects different 
ways in which states fulfil their obligations (2016, paragraph 10.3).  He is quite clear that 
Article 7 ‘is not a specific “limitation” clause that permits restrictions to the realisation of 
rights’ (2016, paragraph 10.4). Finally, on the various limitations to human rights found in 
Article 8, Edmund Soon is emphatic that  
 
Article 8 provides for permissible restrictions couched in a general way without 
meaning to potentially apply to all human rights under the AHRD. The intention could 
not have been to apply to all rights considering by the time the AHRD was adopted, 
certain rights had been well-entrenched as being non-derogable (2016, paragraph 11.3). 
 
He notes that the UDHR has a similar provision and that ‘it is well-established that any 
interpretation of human rights must be towards the promotion, and not the destruction of, the 
same rights’ (2016, paragraph 12). The point is less that Edmund Soon is right, but rather his 
interpretation of the AHRD is an example of argumentative discourse to reinforce AICHR’s 
commitment to international standards of human rights and ward against backtracking. If a 
member state, or in AICHR discussion a representative, defends their limiting of human 
rights by making recourse to the AHRD, this can be disputed on that grounds that such a 
move undermines ASEAN’s human rights’ credentials. By arguing the AHRD meets the 
minimum standards of international human rights law, and because ASEAN members are 
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socially vulnerable to the accusation AICHR does not meet this standard, and the 
interpretation has come from an AICHR representative, it sets ASEAN’s human rights 
prescriptive status as meeting the minimum standards of international human rights law. 
 
The attempt to change AICHR’s modality, which here I am conflating with governance 
structure and regime type, is less documented but nevertheless underpins the persuasion that 
the Indonesian AICHR representative, Dinna Wisnu, has used to progress the promotion of 
human rights. Recognising that equating consensus with unanimity and non-interference with 
indifference is a hindrance, Dinna Wisnu has focused on the notion of best practice. Her 
argument is that the promotion of human rights can be achieved when action plans are 
pursued by some member states and establish best practice that others can follow if they so 
wish. This, as noted earlier, is the essence of the ASEAN Way; a familiar, non-threatening 
environment based on mutual respect that engenders trust and confidence that members are 
not pursuing actions at the expense of one another. Through establishing best practice reticent 
members can, firstly, opt out thus not preventing others from acting, and secondly, opt in 
later. Consensus is achieved and non-interference is respected while establishing best practice 
to follow at some future point. The idea that some members can act and others can follow if 
they want has resonance more widely in ASEAN. There is increasing concern that a two-tier 
ASEAN has formed and this is impeding the realisation of its community building ambitions. 
The notion of best practice therefore reflects a wider impetus to ensure ASEAN is active and 
not procrastinating. Given the sensitivities surrounding human rights, specific adjustments to 
AICHR’s ToR might be unlikely to gain support, but evidence that consensus has created a 
degree of comfort with discussing human rights can be discerned by the increasing activity of 
AICHR representatives that concurrently hold government positions. In essence, “best 
practice” interprets consensus and non-interference as enablers rather than constrainers of 
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activity, and thus by contesting the meaning of consensus and non-interference the modus 
operandi of AICHR is becoming propitious for laying the groundwork that turns a 





With ASEAN citizens’ human rights routinely denied and repression widespread from 
Myanmar in the West to the Philippines in the East, the notion that AICHR, an 
intergovernmental body, is at phase 4 of the Spiral Model and preparing the ground for phase 
5 appears absurd. However, utilising PPoHR’s mechanisms and scoping conditions it is 
possible to show that this is indeed the case. The most important scoping condition is regime 
type and the degree to which it is in transition. The stronger the regime the more it is able to 
resist human rights advocates through counter-narratives, either by rejecting the rights 
(immunization) or reframing them (defiance). By positing AICHR as a “participatory space” 
it is necessary to determine the robustness of its regime-type. The argument made is that the 
more independently minded AICHR representatives have problematized the modus operandi 
of AICHR by using the notion of best practice. This reinterprets the ASEAN Way and is 
equivalent to regime transition. Another important scoping condition is social vulnerability 
and here AICHR and its implementation of the AHRD leave it vulnerable to the accusation it 
falls short of international standards. The reinforcement that the AHRD does meet the 
international standards of human rights establishes the benchmark that ASEAN commitments 
and compliance can be measured against and ensures that any backtracking can be exposed. 
ASEAN is socially vulnerable to this because AICHR represents ASEAN’s international 




With these two scoping conditions (regime type and social vulnerability) propitious for 
change, AICHR representatives have been able to utilise the mechanism persuasion to initiate 
a variety of activities to promote and ultimately protect human rights. By utilising existing 
ASEAN and international human rights commitments, progress on principles of 
discrimination and access to justice for all can be discerned. In the first instance these are on 
relatively non-contentious areas, such as rights for the disabled, but areas of more contention, 
such as land rights, have been discussed. It is also pertinent to note that AICHR 
representatives that concurrently hold government positions have become more active and 
thus the prospects of achieving action plans that establish best practice have increased. This 
will be the evidence of a commitment becoming compliance and the prospects of action plans 
being agreeable to member states are enhanced because the recommendations are coming 
from their own officials.  
 
Of course the trajectory can change; movement through the Spiral Model is not unidirectional 
and contestation is perpetual. The scoping conditions relating to how much control the state 
has over compliance reveals that although AICHR is the overarching human rights body, its 
alignment with the ACWC and its relationship with other ASEAN bodies is ambiguous. 
Ultimately, decisions reached by AICHR require other ASEAN bodies, as well as national 
governments, to do the implementing.  “Immunization” and “defiance” can arise at any stage 
leading to rhetorical adaptations that stymie the progress from commitment to compliance 
with international human rights standards. Charting ASEAN members’ progression and 
regression through the phases is evidence that movement through the Spiral Model is not 
unidirectional. This is no less true of AICHR. The argument that can be heard in ASEAN that 
AICHR’s mandate is not promote and then protect but rather promote is protect – because if 
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you get promotion right then you automatically protect – is evidence that AICHR’s trajectory 
is far from unidirectional. Contestation is a constant companion throughout the phases; it is 
the persistent battle for, not power of, human rights. 
 
                                                 
1 Interviews conducted with Dinna Wisnu, current Indonesian AICHR representative, 17 
March 2016. Rafendi Djamin, Indonesian AICHR representative 2009-2015, 18 March 2016. 
Sriprapha Petcharamesree, Thailand AICHR representative 2009-2012, 16 March 2016. Seree 
Nonthasoot, current Thailand AICHR representative, 14 March 2016 and 23 October 2017. 
Barry Desker, current Singapore AICHR representative, 12 October 2017. For matters of 
confidentiality, I have not attributed the interviewees to points made in this article. 
2 In their press release the ASEAN Civil Society Conference / ASEAN Peoples Forum 2017 
stated: ‘Poor and innocent people and leaders of groups challenging government policies 
become targets of extra judicial killings and forced disappearances in most countries in 
Southeast Asia. The cases of Jonas Burgos, Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeno, and Gloria 
Capitan from the Philippines, Sombath Somphone from Laos, Thailand’s Somchai 
Neelaphaijit and Porlajee “Billy” Rakchongchaoren, Malaysia’s Raymond Koh, and 
Myanmar’s U Ko Ni among hundreds of other cases of enforced disappearances and extra-
judicial killings in Southeast Asia remain unresolved showing how impunity still prevails in 
the region’ (ASEAN Civil Society Conference, 2017). 
3 AICHR is currently pursuing eleven thematic studies. Thematic studies, regional 
workshops, thematic workshops, seminars, study visits, training programmes, road shows are 
all types of activities and programmes that AICHR representatives can initiate in order to 
achieve, through Task Forces, the goals established by AICHR’s Work Plan.  AICHR is 
currently pursuing the second of its Five-Year Work Plans (2016-2020).  
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4 The ToR contains the provision that it must be reviewed after its initial five years by 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers and then can be reviewed at subsequent times by the foreign 
ministers on AICHR’s recommendation.  
5 Although officially flexible engagement was rejected by ASEAN – the official 
nomenclature is enhanced interaction – many of its features subsequently informed ASEAN 
behaviour (see Acharya, 2014, pp. 151-2). 
6 The specifics governing the engagement between AICHR and Sectoral Bodies are contained 
in section 10 of the Guidelines on the Operations of the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). The language does not authorise AICHR to require 
conformity by Sectoral Bodies, instead the working relationship is couched in phrases such as 
“recommend”, “request”, and AICHR can only attend sectoral bodies meetings by invitation. 
The line of authority between AICHR and ASEAN’s Sectoral Bodies is ambiguous hence 
paragraph 10.3: ‘The format and level of participation of such engagement will be determined 
through consultations by AICHR and relevant sectoral bodies’ (ASEAN, 2012c). 
7 Funds for AICHR’s Work Plan can come directly from member states or via an Endowment 
Fund, but they can also be sourced from Dialogue Partners, donor countries, international 
agencies, the private sector, and nongovernmental organisations. Although the caveat is 
added that any funding from, ‘non-ASEAN Member States shall be solely for human rights 
promotion, capacity building and education’, and not, therefore presumably, protection 
(ASEAN, 2012c, paragraph 13.1.2).  
8 On the importance of external legitimacy in the creation of AICHR see Poole (2015). 
9 On the 13-14 December 2017 in Da Nang, Vietnam, Nguyen Thi Nha, the Vietnamese 
AICHR Representative, held an AICHR Regional Workshop on Enhanced Access to 
Education for Children with Disabilities. This was held back-to-back with the 4th meeting of 
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the Task Force on the Mainstreaming of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the 
ASEAN Community. 
10 The lack of initiatives from those AICHR representatives that concurrently hold 
government positions can be explained by (a) their concern that doing so will create tensions 
between ministries/departments within their own government as they are seen to impinge on 
someone else’s area of concern (b) a bureaucratic structure that requires multiple approvals 
before it can be initiated thus removing incentives for doing so, or (c) the representatives 
general lack of interest in human rights. 
11 Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia continue to suffer from the munitions dropped during the 




Acharya, A. (1999). Southeast Asia’s Democratic Moment. Asian Survey, 39/3, 418-432. 
 
Acharya, A. (2014). Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the 
problem of regional order (3rd ed.). London: Routledge 
 
APHR (2017). Democracy and human rights at risk as ASEAN turns 50, parliamentarians 




ASEAN (2009). ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (Terms of 
Reference). ASEAN Secretariat, October, retrieved from: http://aichr.org/documents/ 
41 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
ASEAN (2012a). ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. ASEAN Secretariat, 18 November, 
retrieved from: http://aichr.org/documents/ 
 
ASEAN (2012b). Phnom Penh Statement on the Adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration. ASEAN Secretariat, 18 November, retrieved from http://aichr.org/documents/ 
 
ASEAN (2012c). Guidelines on the Operations of the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). ASEAN Secretariat. 12 March.  
 
ASEAN (2013). Bali Declaration on the Enhancement of the Role and Participation of the 
Persons with Disabilities in ASEAN Community and the Mobilisation Framework of the 




ASEAN (2017a). AICHR looks at legal aid to promote access to justice for all. ASEAN 
Secretariat, 23 October, retrieved from: http://asean.org/aichr-looks-at-legal-aid-to-promote-
access-to-justice-for-all/  
 
ASEAN (2017b). ASEAN conduct training on the linkages between business activities and 






                                                                                                                                                        
ASEAN Civil Society Conference (2017). Civil Society to ASEAN Leaders: “Address 
Human Rights and Security Issues Seriously”. ASEAN Civil Society Conference / ASEAN 
Peoples Forum Press Release 29 April, retrieved from: 
https://www.facebook.com/acscapfph2017/posts/1886847141536478:0  
 
Bello, W. (2017). Bumpy Road for the Philippines as ASEAN Chair. Reporting ASEAN, 2 
October, retrieved from: http://www.aseannews.net/bumpy-road-philippines-asean-chair-2/  
 
Cherry, J. (2013). The Great Southeast Asian Land Grab. The Diplomat, 8 August, retrieved 
from: https://thediplomat.com/2013/08/the-great-southeast-asian-land-grab/   
 
Christopher, E. (2014). Behind the Boko Haram headlines, slavery in Africa is the real crisis. 
The Conversation 12 May, retrieved from: theconversation.com/behind-the-boko-haram-
headlines-slavery-in-africa-is-the-real-crisis-26379 
 
CNN (2014). ISIS states its justification for the enslavement of women. CNN 13 October, 
retrieved from: edition.cnn.com/2014/10/12/world/meast/isis-justification-slavery/index.html 
 
Davies, M. (2013). Explaining the Vientiane Action Programme: ASEAN and the 
institutionalisation of human rights. The Pacific Review, 26/4, 385-406. 
 
Davies, M. (2014a). States of Compliance?: Global Human Rights Treaties and ASEAN 




                                                                                                                                                        
Davies, M. (2014b). An Agreement to Disagree: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and 
the Absence of Regional Identity in Southeast Asia. Journal of Current Southeast Asian 
Affairs, 33/3, 107-129. 
 
Dixon, J. M. (2017). Rhetorical Adaptation and Resistance to International Norms. 
Perspectives on Politics, 15/1, 83-99. 
 
Dosch, J. (2008). ASEAN’s reluctant liberal turn and the thorny road to democracy 
promotion. The Pacific Review, 21/4, 527–545. 
 
Forum Asia (2016). Breaking the Silence and Unlocking Barriers for Human Rights 
Protection in ASEAN. Forum Asia, 4 October, retrieved from: https://www.forum-
asia.org/?p=21644  
  
Gavilan, J. (2017). The Deafening Silence of ASEAN on Human Rights Violations. Rappler, 
13 November, retrieved from: https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/187759-asean-
2017-human-rights-violations-deafening-silence  
 
Gerard, K. (2014). ASEAN’s Engagement of Civil Society: Regulating Dissent. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Human Rights Watch (2012). Civil Society Denounces Adoption of Flawed ASEAN Human 





                                                                                                                                                        
 
Human Rights Watch (2017). Thailand: Supreme Court Enshrines Impunity for 2010 
Violence. 1 September, retrieved from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/01/thailand-
supreme-court-enshrines-impunity-2010-violence  
 
Interaksyon (2017). Karapatan slams ASEAN rights body for ‘inaction’ as more killings 




Jetschke, A. and Liese, A. (2013). The power of human rights a decade after: from euphoria 
to contestation?. In T. Risse, S. C. Ropp, and K. Sikkink (Eds.), The Persistent Power of 
Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance (pp. 26-42). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Munro, J. (2011). The relationship between the origins and regime design of the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). The International Journal of 
Human Rights, 15/8, 1185-1214. 
 
Neef, A. (2016). Land Rights Matter! Anchors to Reduce Land Grabbing, Dispossession and 






                                                                                                                                                        
Nuñez-Mietz, F. G. and Garcia Iommi, L. (2017). Can Transnational Norm Advocacy 
Undermine Internalization? Explaining Immunization Against LGBT Rights in Uganda. 
International Studies Quarterly, 61, 196-209.  
 
Poole, A. (2015). “The World is Outraged”: Legitimacy in the Making of the ASEAN Human 
Rights Body. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 37/3, 355-80. 
 
Renshaw, C. (2016). Human Trafficking in Southeast Asia: Uncovering the Dynamics of 
State Commitment and Compliance. Michigan Journal of International Law, 37/4, 611-659.  
 
Risse, T., Ropp, S. C., and Sikkink, K. (1999). The Power of Human Rights: International 
Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Risse, T., Ropp, S. C., and Sikkink, K. (2013). The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From 
Commitment to Compliance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Roberts, C. (2010). ASEAN’s Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security 
Community. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
 
Ryu, Y. and Ortuoste, M. (2014). Democratization, regional integration, and human rights: 





                                                                                                                                                        
Sikkink, K. (2013). The United States and torture: does the spiral model work?. In T. Risse, 
S. C. Ropp, and K. Sikkink (Eds.), The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From 
Commitment to Compliance (pp. 145-163). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Smith, T. (2017). Duterte's Latest Target: The Commission on Human Rights. The Diplomat, 
8 August, retrieved from: https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/dutertes-latest-target-the-
commission-on-human-rights/  
 
Soon, E. B. T. (2016). GENERAL OBSERVATION NO. 1/2016: Interpretation of Articles 6, 
7 & 8 of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 2012. 23 September, retrieved from 
https://www.facebook.com/aichrmalaysia/posts/2014433755460940  
 
Tan, H. (2011a). The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights: 
Institutionalising Human Rights in Southeast Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Tan, H. (2011b). Persistent engagement and insistent persuasion: the role of the working 
group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism in institutionalizing human rights in the 
region. In H. Nasu and B. Saul (Eds.), Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region: Towards 
institution building (pp. 127-143). London: Routledge  
 
Terman, R. (2017). Rewarding Resistance: Theorizing Defiance to International Norms. 
Retrieved from http://rochelleterman.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/4b_Defiance.pdf  
 
The Jakarta Post (2017). Jokowi orders police to gun down foreign drug traffickers. The 
Jakarta Post 22 July, retrieved from: 
47 
 




The Guardian (2016). Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte urges people to kill drug addicts. 
The Guardian (UK newspaper) 1 July, retrieved from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/01/philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-urges-
people-to-kill-drug-addicts   
 
WND (2003). SAUDI SHEIK: “SLAVERY IS PART OF ISLAM”. WND 10 November, 
retrieved from: www.wnd.com/2003/11/21700/  
 
